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Abstract
The disenchantment of reality has bankrupted conventional sources of meaning for 
many people in modern Western cultures. This has led a growing number of figures 
and groups to search for alternative sources of meaning. Typical of their quests for 
meaning is the entanglement of secular and religious discourses. Since the twentieth 
century, scholars have studied the social configurations of these figures and groups as 
“cults” or “new religious movements” and their ideologies as “New Age” or “spiritual-
ity,” which are seen as parts of a longer tradition of “Western esotericism” (Europe) 
or “metaphysical religion” (North America). Several leading scholars have also inter-
preted them as forms of “secular religion,” but this has yet to gain academic traction. 
This article argues that the former concepts are lacking or losing a logical connection 
with the socio-historical phenomena to which they pertain and reintroduces the latter 
concept as a more appropriate one.
Keywords
quests for meaning – modern gurus – cults – new religious movements – secular 
religion – new age – spirituality – Western esotericism – metaphysical religion
…
I often, though not exclusively, define religion functionally as any set of 
symbols or rituals that provide a sense of life meaning and orientation, 
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regardless of whether they are drawn from traditional religions, philoso-
phy, psychology, or aspects of an otherwise secular culture.
Dennis Ford, The Search for Meaning: A Short History
∵
In The Search for Meaning (2007), Dennis Ford reflects on some of the answers 
provided by different disciplines to questions about the reason for (“why?”) 
and the direction of (“what for?”) human existence. Taking his cue from Leo 
Tolstoy (1932 [1882]), Ford tells us how his existential search commenced in 
Christianity, gradually extended to other established religions and eventually 
also incorporated secular answers from various philosophies, psychologies, 
and natural sciences (xx–xxi). Ford’s entangled quest for meaning is far from 
unique. In On Purpose (2016), for instance, sociologist Paul Froese echoes Max 
Weber (1978 [1921–1922]), saying that modernity’s “disenchantment” of real-
ity has bankrupted conventional sources of meaning for a growing number 
of people in modern Western cultures. Reminiscent of psychiatrist Viktor 
Frankl’s reflections on Man’s Search for Meaning (1984 [1946]), Froese finds 
that these people have turned to alternative sources of meaning instead, secu-
lar and religious — including self-help strategies, psychotherapies, and vari-
ous spiritualties — to find fulfillment in this world in something that is larger 
than themselves.
In this article, I will not delve into the details of these entangled quests 
for meaning in modern Western cultures. There is a growing library of aca-
demic publications available on them, many of which I will also refer to in 
my discussions below. In fact, my discussions below are about these studies 
about entangled quests for meaning of a wide range of figures and groups 
in modern Western cultures. I will reflect on how European and North 
American scholars — mostly sociologists and historians — since the early– 
mid-twentieth century, have studied these figures and groups as “cults” or “new 
religious movements” (NRMs) and their teachings as “New Age” or “spirituality,” 
which, in turn, have been studied as manifestations of “Western esotericism” 
(Europe) and “metaphysical religion” (North America). Given their historical 
overlap, I will include shifts in the study of their social formations and shifts in 
the study of their ideological foundations, but focus on the entangled nature 
of the latter.
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These socio-historical reflections will show that none of the common con-
cepts that are currently used for entangled quests for meaning in modern 
Western cultures adequately capture the figures and groups to whom they per-
tain. I will furthermore show that several leading sociologists and historians 
have convincingly interpreted those same figures and groups as exemplars of 
“secular religion,” but that this has been overlooked. Therefore, I will reintro-
duce their concept as a more adequate marker for the growing entanglements 
of secular and religious discourses in Europe and North America. By extrap-
olating similar elements from different interpretations, I arrive at a revised 
definition of secular religion. I conclude with a brief demonstration of the 
conceptual advantages of my revised version of secular religion by comparing 
it to the more common concepts that it intends to replace.
These are ambitious plans for an article. How can this limited space do 
full justice to the detailed contexts out of which the nuanced concepts above 
emerged? It cannot. For details and nuances, I must refer readers to my The 
Secular Religion of Franklin Merrell-Wolff (2018). This article builds on that 
socio-historical study but pursues more conceptual clarity. Why is more con-
ceptual clarity necessary? Because there are many concepts for the entangle-
ment of secular and religious discourses in modern Western cultures that do 
not, or no longer, fit the beliefs and practices of the figures and groups to whom 
they pertain. And for the one concept that does fit, there are many entangled 
interpretations again. Thus, we need to find the right words for what we are try-
ing to understand. This is not a trivial matter of terminology but a fundamental 
matter of perception. For our concepts determine not just how we perceive 
things, but what things we perceive to begin with.
1 Conceptualizing Secular and Religious Entanglements
1.1 The Cultic Milieu
Early in the twentieth century, Max Weber (1985 [1906]) introduced a distinc-
tion between “churches” and “sects.” The first are central religious institutes 
that recruit by obligation, the second peripheral religious groups that do so 
by voluntary association. Fellow sociologist Ernst Troeltsch (1992 [1912]: 331–
343) later added the more individualized and privatized “mysticism.” Richard 
Niebuhr (1929: 17–21) converted the strict contrasts between these types into 
a continuum, which categorizes religious groups based on their stance toward 
secular culture. Finally, our current notion of a “cult,” as a divergent but often 
short-lived socio-religious fringe group, seems to have come from Howard 
Becker (1932: 624–628).
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During the second half of the twentieth century — as the number of reli-
gious fringe groups grew, or at least grew more visible, in Western cultures — 
other sociologists began to criticize church–sect typologies. Benton Johnson 
(1957, 1963), for instance, took issue with their socio-historical contingencies. 
He suggested looking for a single defining feature. Reminiscent of Niebuhr, 
for him, this was a religious group’s acceptance (church) or rejection (sect) 
of their secular environment. Erich Goode (1967) discarded church–sect 
typologies altogether, including Johnson’s, since none of them seemed univer-
sally applicable. When it comes to cults, Geoffrey Nelson (1969) agreed with 
his peers that these fringe groups, unlike sects, drew inspiration from sources 
other than the dominant religions of their host societies. Contrary to his peers, 
though, Nelson concluded that not all cults were as ephemeral and disorga-
nized as scholars had made them out to be. Nevertheless, cults typically com-
prised “seekers.” Most seekers were “floundering about among religions,” as 
John Lofland and Rodney Stark (1965: 869) put it. And this did appear to limit 
significantly the lifespan of most of such fringe groups. How to reconcile these 
contradictory observations?
In 1972, Colin Campbell came up with a clever answer to this question in 
his ground-breaking “The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularization” (1972). 
According to Campbell, cults can be equated with Troeltschian mysticism 
or with religious and scientific heterodoxy or with both (119–126). The fact 
that old cults continuously disappear, while new cults emerge, suggests they 
move within a larger milieu, which absorbs the debris of dead ones and gives 
birth to new ones. Such a “cultic milieu” is the cultural underground of soci-
ety, Campbell argued, which fosters deviant religious and secular beliefs and 
practices. These beliefs and practices are held together by a shared ideology of 
seekership, which is based on the idea(l) that one can explore both religious 
and secular sources in the quest for meaning.
The increase of the cultic milieu is due to the secularization of modern 
Western cultures, according to Campbell (1972: 131–133). For him, seculariza-
tion means the declining influence of religion, on the one hand, and the rising 
influence of science, on the other. This process has demoted the role of the 
churches as custodians of truth and promoted universities to that position. 
Because the scientific community has neither the desire nor the ability to re-
press heterodox views with the same zeal as the church, divergent ideologies 
have been able to grow.
During the 1980s, Campbell’s “cultic milieu” lost some of its academic ap-
peal, despite its explanatory power. This was probably due to the increasingly 
negative reputation that cults were gaining in the public eye. In the wake of the 
widely publicized serial killing spree of the Manson Family in 1967, the armed 
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bank robberies of the Symbionese Liberation Army in 1974, and especially 
the Jonestown mass murder-suicide of the People’s Temple in 1978, “cults” got a 
bad name (van Driel and Richardson 1988; Richardson 1993; Richardson and van 
Driel 1997); they still carry this reputation today (Olson 2006; Neal 2011; Laylock 
2013). As sociologist Eileen Barker noted soon after, “No new religion would be 
regarded in quite the same light or treated in quite the same way after 
Jonestown” (1986: 330).
Even though the People’s Temple was not a typical case (Richardson 1980), 
anticult movements presented the general public with an image of cults as 
pseudoreligions, which disguise themselves as real religions for legal and fiscal 
benefits. As Anson Shupe and David Bromley (1979: 331) explain, cults were 
framed as vehicles for the selfish desires of egotistical charlatans, who mislead 
youngsters for financial, sexual, and other personal gains. Followers of cult 
leaders did not go through a process of religious conversion but of psycho-
logical coercion. In other words, they were “brainwashed.” This popular the-
ory briefly gained academic legitimacy when psychologists such as Margaret 
Singer (2003a, 2003b) weighed in with “scientific” explanations. Her peers 
soon disproved her explanations, but, by then, they were already deeply lodged 
in popular culture (Melton 2006).
Trying to shed their negatively biased image, scholars stopped referring to 
fringe groups as “cults” and started describing them as “new religions” or “new 
religious movements” (Robbins 2000; Melton 2004; Gallagher, 2007). Ironically, 
Barker (2004, 2014) points out, this concept has been no less criticized, given 
that many of the groups to whom it pertains are not that new, do not regard 
themselves as a religion, and do not form a movement so much as a loosely 
knit network. In addition, there are few beliefs, practices or lifestyles, if any, 
that are typical of new religions and atypical of older ones.
1.2 The New Age Movement
In the 1990s, scholarly interest in NRMs converged on the “New Age move-
ment.” Building on Campbell, the historian Wouter Hanegraaff concluded 
that “the New Age is synonymous with the cultic milieu having become con-
scious of itself as constituting a more or less unified ‘movement’ (although not 
a ‘New Religious Movement’ in the normal sense of the word)” (1996: 17). A 
recurrent theme among New Age figures and groups was their critique of the 
dualistic and reductionist tendencies of modern Western cultures, Hanegraaff 
argued (1996: 514–522). This consisted of five “basic tendencies”: a (weak) this-
worldly attitude; a holistic worldview; a teleological view of evolution; a psy-
chologization of religion and sacralization of psychology, with a focus on the 
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“realization” of “the self”; and the expectation of a better era in the near future, 
often portrayed as the apogee of a perennial wisdom tradition. New Age turns 
away from the dogmatic faith of established religions (Jewish and Christian 
traditions in particular) and the excessive reason of conventional sciences to-
ward an experiential mystical gnosis.
Given the shared “tendencies,” New Age sounds very much like a unified 
movement. Yet Hanegraaff insisted the New Age movement was not a new 
religious movement in the regular sense of the word, given its “transorgani-
zational” character as a diffuse cultic milieu. Sociologist Paul Heelas (1996: 9) 
similarly stressed that the New Age movement was not a new religion or a col-
lection of new religions — despite his earlier description of it as “self-religions” 
(Heelas 1982, 1988). Many other scholars agreed with them. In fact, as George 
Chryssides explains, the term “New Age” itself has been criticized for covering 
too great a variety of concepts, blurring emic and etic views, and having lost 
its significance for the figures and groups to whom it pertains (2007: 10–13). 
Having said that, Chryssides himself still thinks it has sufficient emic and etic 
currency (22). However, as scholars were turning toward New Age, New Agers 
themselves were already turning away from it.
1.3 Spirituality
In the 1990s, the term “New Age” slowly disappeared in popular culture, as 
“spirituality” took its place (Jespers 2013: 198–199). Perhaps because scholars 
such as Hanegraaff (1996: 105) had pointed out the superficiality of its beliefs 
and practices — at least in the eyes of the intellectual elite — the concept of 
“New Age” fell out of grace with the very figures and groups to whom it was ap-
plied. The latter were now increasingly identifying themselves as “spiritual, but 
not religious” (Fuller 2001; Giordan and Swatos 2011).
Soon, academia caught up with this discursive change. Despite its preva-
lence in popular and academic circles, scholars have found spirituality noto-
riously difficult to define. Wade Clark Roof starts at the etymological root of 
spiritus as wind or breath, that mysterious, invisible force that moves (1999: 
33–35). Leigh Schmidt adds that Christian theologians opposed this idea of 
spirit to matter (2005: 4), while for Philip Sheldrake their spirituality was not 
opposed to materiality but to carnality (2007: 2–3). Details aside, spirituality 
has long been taken as the metaphysical essence of religion (Huss 2014: 19). 
Gordon Lynch believes this has given way to a “progressive spirituality,” which 
sees the divine as the metaphysical intelligence beyond and the physical el-
ements within this world (2007: 11). Regardless of what adjectives they stick 
to it, most scholars agree that contemporary spirituality refers to beliefs and 
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practices of figures and groups on a quest for meaning beyond themselves that 
is not restricted to a single tradition. Such quests for meaning are often in-
spired by a desire to realize “something more” in this world (Besecke 2014: 1–8).
Spirituality gained so much traction in the twenty-first century that some 
scholars started to speak of a “spiritual revolution.” Interdisciplinary scholar 
David Tacey (2004) and, less radically, sociologists Paul Heelas and Linda 
Woodhead (2005), for instance, maintain that religion is giving way to spiritu-
ality. Tacey claims that “Spirituality is now the concern of everyone, religious 
or secular” (2004: 1). Heelas and Woodhead explain that “spirituality” common-
ly expresses a “commitment to a deep truth that is to be found within what 
belongs to this world,” whereas “religion” expresses a “commitment to a higher 
truth that is ‘out there,’ lying beyond what this world has to offer” (2005: 6).
Such etic legitimations of emic distinctions have not been without their 
critics. The psychologist of religion Ulrike Popp-Baier (2010), for one, wonders 
whether spirituality is significantly different from religion. Reminiscent of 
Richard King and Jeremy Carrette (2005), she claims “spirituality” has been — 
questionably — commodified by the media and (religious) organizations for 
marketing purposes as well as by scholars of religion for the purpose of attract-
ing larger audiences. Looking at the beliefs and practices of so-called spiri-
tual seekers, she only sees a more individualized “self-controlled religiosity” 
(Popp-Baier 2010: 59–61). She advises her peers to drop the misnomer of spiri-
tuality altogether.
I would take her advice, without adopting her “self-controlled religiosity,” 
for that would restrict our focus to religion. Despite its etymological ties to the 
metaphysical, the one thing contemporary “spirituality” has going for it is its 
recognition of the entanglement of religious and secular discourses. As the 
scholar of religion Boaz Huss puts it, “contemporary spirituality challenges the 
division created in the modern era between the religious and secular realms of 
life and enables the formation of new lifestyles, social practices, and cultural 
artifacts that cannot be defined as either religious or secular” (2014: 47).
In pursuit of more conceptual clarity, scholar of religion Frans Jespers distin-
guishes between religious and secular spirituality. Jespers (2014: 214) considers 
Peter van Ness’s definition of “spirituality” particularly adequate for religious 
studies, as “the embodied task of realizing one’s true self in the context of real-
ity apprehended as a cosmic totality” (1996: 5). Jespers then clarifies the differ-
ence between its religious and secular variants.
Relying on Martin Riesebrodt (2010), Jespers (2014: 209, 212–213) corre-
lates religious spirituality with promises of salvation by a supernatural power 
beyond this world. Riesebrodt himself defines religion as an assortment of 
practices marked by an interpretative cohesion based on the premise of the 
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existence of superhuman — be it personal or impersonal — powers that 
promise salvation (2010: 72–79). The distinction between “supernatural” and 
“superhuman” powers is significant for our discussion. Both adjectives imply 
invisible influences over dimensions that are beyond our immediate control, 
but the latter does not necessarily entail metaphysical entities or forces that do 
not belong to this world.
Relying on van Ness (1996), Jespers correlates secular spirituality with “the 
‘this-worldly’: a secular way of life that involves all important things in this 
world” (2014: 207, 209). A secular way of life here implies a perception of the 
world that is not directly tied to religion and an organization of society that 
allows its members to pursue both religious and nonreligious paths to fulfill-
ment (van Ness 1996: 7–8). “Fulfillment,” in turn, refers to positive psychologist 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s “optimal experience” (van Ness 1996: 6), an extraor-
dinary stream of consciousness that is sought for its own sake. Together, this 
leads Jespers to define secular spirituality with van Ness as “the attempt to lo-
cate optimal human experience within a non-religious context of existential 
and cosmic meaning” (7).
Despite such pursuits of more conceptual clarity, scholars agree that “spiri-
tuality” remains a problematic category (King and Carrette 2005: 1–2; Flanagan 
2007: 5; Sutcliffe and Gilhus 2013: 5; Hense 2014: 1). To study New Age and spiri-
tuality with a less emically biased and less etically blurred vocabulary, many 
of them have turned to two other — second-order — concepts, which are 
“Western esotericism” and “metaphysical religion.”
1.4 Western Esotericism
New Age spirituality did not emerge out of thin air. Historians have traced 
many of its beliefs and practices to ancient, medieval, and modern traditions 
that similarly straddled the borders between — what we would today sepa-
rate into — secular and religious domains (Ellwood and Partin 1973: 30–72; 
Hanegraaff 1996: 365–513; Versluis 2007; von Stuckrad 2005; Goodrick-Clarke 
2008). In the 1960s, Frances Yates (1964) referred to them collectively as “the 
Hermetic tradition.” For her, this tradition was a self-contained counterculture 
grounded in the magic and mysticism of the ancient Corpus Hermeticum.
In the 1990s, Antoine Faivre reframed this Hermetic tradition as “western 
esotericism.” Faivre (1994: 10–15) defined Western esotericism as traditions and 
currents rooted in the Renaissance with a shared forme de pensée. This “form 
of thought” entails six recurrent beliefs: there are correspondences among the 
seen and the unseen aspects of the universe; a living nature permeates real-
ity; through imagination and mediation of rituals, symbols, and spirits, one 
can access higher knowledge; this higher knowledge is the key to personal 
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transmutation; there is a concordance or common core among religions with 
regards to this higher knowledge; and this common core has been passed on 
from master to disciple by way of secret transmission.
In the 2000s, scholars criticized Faivre’s “form of thought” for its temporal 
and geographical reductionism as well as for its historical and cultural es-
sentialism (McCalla 2001; Bogdan 2010: 99; Bergunder 2010: 11–16). It fails to 
consider that, let alone how, Western esotericism may have changed since the 
Renaissance — for instance, due to developments such as secularization and 
globalization — which curiously suspends it in time.
Going beyond Yates’s “quasi-autonomous counterculture of magic and 
mysticism” and Faivre’s “quasi-essentialist form of thought,” Hanegraaff 
(2001; 2005: 226; 2007: 107–108) borrows James Webb’s label for the occult 
(1974: 191) by characterizing Western esotericism as “a wastebasket of rejected 
knowledge.” Hanegraaff contends that Western esotericism is a product of 
an anti-image polemics, which goes back to the origins of monotheism. He 
calls this the “Grand Polemical Narrative.” For him, mainstream Western 
society constructed “Western esotericism” as its Other, against which it con-
structed its own traditional identity. Images have played a — arguably even 
the — central role in this. From the perspectives of Biblical monotheism and 
Greek rationalism, images spell “trouble,” Hanegraaff explains, since they un-
dermine their understanding of the divine as radical alterity and of truth as 
having rational clarity.
Kocku von Stuckrad has criticized this view of Western esotericism. He con-
curs with Hanegraaff that “polemics and identities are at the core of esoteric 
discourses,” but questions whether the grand polemical narrative goes back to 
beyond the scientific revolution, or whether such a quasi-essentialist narra-
tive helps to understand the history of esoteric discourses in Western cultures 
to begin with (von Stuckrad 2010: 52). Instead, von Stuckrad regards “the eso-
teric” as a component of discourse in a twofold competition of knowledge — 
between different religions and different secular domains — throughout the 
histories of Western cultures (2005: 9–10; 2010: 59–64; 2014). Esoteric discourse 
in modern Europe and North America in particular reveal “discursive knots,” 
whereby secular methods and theories are employed to elaborate and legiti-
mate religious claims concerning a privileged experiential access to a hidden 
“higher knowledge” of reality (von Stuckrad 2012; 2014).
Egil Asprem has boldly suggested to move beyond both the “Western” and 
“the esoteric” of Western esotericism. Following von Stuckrad (2005: xi–xii), 
Asprem presumes that “esoteric discourse is in principle open for application to 
any knowledge claim in any culture at any time in history” (2014a: 17). Contrary 
to von Stuckrad, however, Asprem also proposes to replace “the esoteric” with 
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“the problem of disenchantment” — responses to the perceived loss of a high-
er meaning in this world — at the center of the discussion (2014b: 549–550). 
According to him, such a Weberian shift of focus could better account for mod-
ern entanglements of religious and scientific discourses (2014b: 560).
In his reply to Asprem, Hanegraaff (2015) sympathizes with the desire to 
go beyond the “Western” of Western esotericism in our globalizing world, but 
says that a globalization of “esotericism” would sustain the very terminological 
imperialism it tries to escape. The term “esotericism” emerged as a convenient 
label for a range of beliefs and practices that the Enlightenment rejected. Why 
would people in Asia, Africa, or Latin America adopt a Western category to 
study their own traditional beliefs and practices, he rhetorically asks.
1.5 Metaphysical Religion
In search of a North-American-tailored counterpart to the arguably Eurocentric 
“Western esotericism,” scholars of religion across the Atlantic coined “meta-
physical religion.” This concept also pertains to alternative quests for meaning 
outside conventional churches and schools, which budded in America during 
the nineteenth century and blossomed in the twentieth century. Typical ex-
amples are Theosophy and New Thought, whose beliefs and practices peaked 
in the New Age movement. The historian Robert Fuller says that their atten-
tion was on “a more-than-physical reality not yet recognized by science” (2001: 
45–46). Fellow historian Catherine Albanese agrees, “metaphysics … signals 
what its etymology suggests — those preoccupied in some sense with what 
lies beyond the physical plane” (2010: 12–13). In her masterful A Republic of 
Mind and Spirit, she makes out four themes among metaphysical religions: a 
preoccupation with the mind; a predisposition toward a theory of correspon-
dences between the microcosm and macrocosm; a strong focus on movement 
and energy, whereby the imagination magically joins forces with the will; and a 
longing for a felt and physical salvation for individuals as well as communities, 
typically characterized in terms of well-being (9, 13–15).
However, the preoccupation with “what lies beyond the physical plane” 
is increasingly at odds with the search for a “felt and physical salvation” in 
this world. Especially since the twentieth century, as Albanese herself says, 
“Metaphysical religiosity — in the declining New Age and in the new spiritual-
ity that was succeeding it — was different from the metaphysical religion of 
a century previous” (514). Typical of this new spirituality was that “the mind 
had … acquired a body, and the body refused to stay out of metaphysical dis-
course” (514). This turn toward an “enlightened body-self” went along with a 
“re-enchantment of the world” (322, 515). Given this focus on an embodied 
transformation of the self in this physical world, the concept of “metaphysical 
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religion” has come to contradict the beliefs and practices of the people to 
whom it pertains.
…
With this very short history of the study of entangled quests for meaning in 
modern Western cultures, we conclude that the seminal concepts sociolo-
gists and historians have used for the entanglement of secular and religious 
discourses are not adequate (anymore). However, some — of these same — 
scholars have suggested another concept for such discursive entanglements. 
Next, I will review various interpretations of this overlooked concept.
2 Conceptualizing Secular Religion
2.1 Secular Religion as Political Religion
Although similar concepts had already been introduced by intellectuals in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the historian Emilio Gentile maintains 
that German political philosophers Eric Voegelin (1901–1985) and his French 
contemporary Raymond Aron (1905–1983) were the first to define “secular re-
ligion” (Gentile 2000: 21–22, 34). For Voegelin and Aron, secular religion was 
principally the sacralization of politics by totalitarian regimes.
In 1938, Voegelin published “The Political Religions,” which argues that mo-
dernity has not destroyed the divine but sacralized the secular (Voegelin 2000 
[1938]: 60). As his editor Manfred Henningsen puts it, “the secularization of 
the world, this major achievement of modernity, has not silenced the quest 
for meaning, but has produced the urge to find alternative ways of satisfying 
this existential human need” (7). People no longer look for meaning beyond 
this world, but within this world. “Trans-worldly religions” (über weltliche 
Religionen) like Christianity are increasingly challenged and replaced by 
“inner-worldly religions” (innerweltliche Religionen) such as psychotherapy 
and communism, that is, secular systems with religious features or functions 
(Voegelin 2000 [1938]: 32–33).
In 1944, Aron argued a similar case in The Future of Secular Religions. 
Modernity has given rise to secular religions such as communism or national 
socialism, which “in the souls of our contemporaries, take the place of the faith 
that is no more, placing the salvation of mankind in this world, in the more or 
less distant future, and in the form of a social order yet to be invented” (Aron 
2002 [1944]: 178). In The Opium of the Intellectuals, he adds that such godless 
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doctrines can be seen as religions, since they perform the same function that 
sociologists and psychologists attribute to a religion (Aron 1962 [1955]: 265).
In 1964, Voegelin’s one-time mentor Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) wrote a cri-
tique of these sacralizations of secular worldviews, which was published 
only recently as Secular Religion. Here, Kelsen calls secular religion an oxy-
moron: “to secularize an institution or a doctrine means to exclude all reli-
gious elements from it … A ‘secular religion’ is a dereligionized religion, which 
means no religion at all” (2012 [1964]: 21). As a neo-Kantian believer in the pil-
lars of the Enlightenment, Kelsen wanted to protect “rational” philosophy, sci-
ence, and politics from a regression into “irrational” religion (271). Meanwhile, 
these “rational” and “irrational” domains were growing more entangled in 
popular culture.
2.2 Secular Religion as Implicit Religion
By the end of the 1960s, the discourse on “secular religion” moved away from 
politics. In 1969, James Dittes was among the first to articulate “the most 
striking religious phenomena of our time” (1969: 65), that whatever had 
been traditionally perceived as religious was now believed to be a barrier 
to the divine and whatever had been considered secular was now viewed as 
a bridge to the divine. In fact, the religious–secular distinction as such was 
being challenged, “epitomized with such implausible but increasingly popular 
paradoxes as ‘atheistic theology,’ ‘religionless Christianity,’ ‘secular religion’ ” 
(Dittes 1969: 66, 67).
In the same year that Dittes’ book was published, Edward Bailey (1969) 
finished his masters thesis on “secular religion.” In his doctoral dissertation, 
Bailey (1976) rephrased it as “implicit religion.” Bailey later clarified that the 
name change left more room for a connection to traditional religions and the 
inclusion of phenomena that may not be seen as religious by those involved 
(2002: iii, 9; 2010: 271–272). Based on theologian Paul Tillich’s famous reduction 
of faith to people’s “ultimate concern” (1957), Bailey equated his concept of im-
plicit religion with “commitments,” “integrating foci,” and “intensive concerns 
with extensive effects” (2002: 2–4).
The strength of “implicit religion” is that it enables scholars to study the 
entanglement of secular and religious beliefs and practices, without adopting, 
let alone legitimating, the emic biases contained in popular concepts such as 
“New Age” and contemporary “spirituality.” But the problem with “implicit re-
ligion” is that the secular dimension of the beliefs and practices of those to 
whom it pertains remains, well, too implicit (pardon the pun). Incidentally, 
the same critique applies to similar concepts such as “invisible religion” 
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(Luckmann 1967) or “civil religion” (Bellah 1967), which arose around the same 
time, as well as to later ones such as “pseudo-” or “quasi-religion” (Bromley, 
Greil, and Robbins, 1994).
“Secular religion” all but faded from academic discourse until the 1980s. 
In 1987, scholar of religion Gottfried Küenzlen returned to it. Reminiscent of 
Voegelin and Aron, but without referring to them, Küenzlen claimed that the 
disenchantment of modern Western cultures had cleared the path for this-
worldly views of salvation such as communism and national socialism (1987: 
211–213). However, because “the hopes of an inner-worldly salvation have be-
come void,” he reckoned “the cry for transcendence and for non-secular reli-
gious orientation will grow.” Just look at “all those new religious movements 
that spring up in the Western world and often, in a curiously syncretistic way, 
include elements of Indian religion,” he said. For Küenzlen, this demonstrated 
that completely secular hopes of salvation cannot fully satisfy our existential 
“hunger for experiencing ‘meaning’” (225).
2.3 Secular Religion as New Age Spirituality
In 1999, perhaps inspired again by James Webb (1976: 12), Hanegraaff pub-
lished an article wherein he conceptualized those syncretic new religious 
movements that had sprung up in the West as “secular religions.” This makes 
it a seminal text for our discussion, even though it does have some issues. The 
most troubling issue is that Hanegraaff claims that “New Age exemplifies a 
new phenomenon which may be defined as ‘secular religion’ based on ‘private 
symbolism,’” without explaining what exactly he means by “secular religion.” 
(1999: 146). The reader is left to piece together its meaning from his definitions 
of “the secular,” or rather “secularization,” “religion” versus “a religion” and 
“spirituality.”
Hanegraaff sees secularization as “the whole of historical developments in 
western society, as a result of which the Christian religion has lost its central 
position as the foundational collective symbolism of western culture and has 
been reduced to merely one among several religious institutions within a cul-
ture which is no longer grounded in a religious system of symbols,” but in “pop-
ular mythologies of science.” (149–152). This departs from early interpretations 
of secularization as a decline of religion (e.g., Berger 1967), but corresponds 
with recent ones about a rising empirical interest in nature and a disembed-
ding from a single religious worldview (e.g., Taylor 2007: 90–158).
Moving on, Hanegraaff sees religion as “any symbolic system which influ-
ences human action by providing possibilities for ritually maintaining contact 
between the everyday world and a more general meta-empirical framework 
of meaning” (1999: 147). Once such a symbolic system is organized as a social 
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institution, it becomes a religion. I really like this definition of (a) religion for 
our discussion about entangled quests for meaning in modern Western cul-
tures. The reason I like it so much, though, is probably that religion is already 
tacitly tailored to such entangled quests for meaning. Speaking of a “general 
meta-empirical framework of meaning” rather than a more common meta-
physical source, such as a god, by definition, creates space for religious and sec-
ular interpretations. It leaves the door wide open to mystical twists to quantum 
physics and various psychological and sociological systems (Hanegraaff 1999: 
153), including, for example, spiritual “shifts in energy” or “shifts in (collective) 
consciousness.” I can imagine more conventional scholars of religion and re-
ligious practitioners would take issue with this unconventional definition of 
(a) religion.
Finally, Hanegraaff sees spirituality as “any human practice which main-
tains contact between the everyday world and a more general meta-empirical 
framework of meaning by way of the individual manipulation of symbolic 
systems” (1999: 147). The emphasis on practices could be problematic, but I 
assume beliefs are implied in “symbolic systems.” The main problem is that 
the figures and groups to whom “spirituality” pertains do not turn to a meta-
empirical framework of meaning. They turn to empirical experts, experiences, 
texts, rites and rituals, places and buildings encountered in this everyday world, 
because these media hold out the promise of contact with an ultimate source 
of meaning, which they go on to explain in both empirical (e.g., “energy”) and 
nonempirical (e.g., “god”) terms.
Hanegraaff concludes that secularization has not so much caused a dissi-
pation but a transformation of religion in modern Western cultures (151–153). 
With the above definitions in mind, he claims that conventional religions are 
facing a growing competition from meaning systems that are no longer based 
on or embedded in traditional religions, but which combine symbolisms from 
secular and religious traditions to give significance to everyday experiences. In 
the end, the conceptual confusion remains, though, for he labels them both as 
“secular religions” and “secular spiritualities” (146, 152; my emphasis).
Several other leading scholars have also introduced variations of “secular re-
ligion” for similar reasons. Martin Marty, for one, thinks we need a new model 
to describe a world that was once seen as religious or secular, but today as re-
ligious and secular. “In adjusting to the complex world around them, people 
confound the categories of the social scientists, theologians and philosophers: 
they simply ‘make do’ with a syncretic and characteristically modern blend 
of attitudes — call it religio-secular” (Marty 2003: 42). Kocku von Stuckrad 
(2013) also reckons that secularization is fitting religion within a new frame-
work of meaning, whereby discursive knots of religious and secular discourses 
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are co-constructing new realities in modern Western cultures, which he goes 
on to designate as “secular religions” (2013).
Recently, “secular religion” has been introduced into popular discourse in 
similar ways for similar reasons as described above. One example is “Secular 
Buddhism” (Batchelor 2017), which focuses on mindfulness. As Jeff Wilson 
explains, “mindfulness does not need to be religious OR spiritual OR thera-
peutic OR secular. It can operate in any of these modes, in more than one of 
these modes at the same time, and the same person can move from one mode 
to another with ease” (2014: 194). Another example is “Bodhidaoism,” which 
“operates like a religion in holding Nature as its ultimate concern, and since 
it has beliefs and practices and advocates a way of life, one could consider it 
a secular religion” (Forrest 2018: 7). It focuses on “awakening to reality,” which 
“can be interpreted as union with God or union with Nature, depending on 
one’s belief system” (10, 75).
3 Defining Secular Religion
Based on these critical reflections on the study of entangled quests for mean-
ing in modern Western cultures — combining the conceptual fortes and flaws 
of “cults,” “new religious movements,” “New Age,” “spirituality,” “Western eso-
tericism,” and “metaphysical religion” with the conceptual variety of “secular 
religion” — I (re)define secular religion as follows:
Secular religion is any practical or intellectual commitment to an ulti-
mate concern beyond the self that promises a fundamental transforma-
tion of the self within this world, which is deemed equally explicable in 
both physical and metaphysical terms.
Secular religion is any practical or intellectual commitment to an ultimate con-
cern beyond the self, that is, any deliberate action or reflection in service of a 
source of meaning larger than our individual self. This source can be a natural 
or supernatural (state of) being, a socio-political utopia, a higher stage in bio-
logical or historical evolution, or a psychosomatic peak experience, as long as 
it promises a fundamental transformation of the self within this world. The prom-
ise of a fundamental transformation of the self may refer to salvation from sin, 
liberation from ignorance, psychological fulfillment, etc. This promise must 
depend on something beyond the self, since that suggests a collective or cos-
mic plan of a higher authority with a more comprehensive view of reality than 
our own, which lends a reassuring sense of purpose to our lives. This higher 
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authority may be a god, spirit, nature, energy, consciousness, or transcendental 
self — it could even refer to society or the state, but here the link to political re-
ligions starts to wear thin. As the source of transformation, this higher author-
ity is often said to be ineffable in absolute terms, but relatively speaking, it is 
deemed equally explicable in physical and metaphysical terms. This means that 
secular and religious discourses are both viewed as valid but partial — that 
is, complementary — explanations of the same nondiscursive reality. This is 
what sets apart secular religions from secular and religious traditions, because 
the latter will ultimately reduce their perception of reality to one particular 
religious, philosophical, psychological, or scientific explanation.
4 Comparing Secular Religion
This last section addresses the advantages of using “secular religion” for the 
entanglement of secular and religious discourses in the quests for meaning 
of a growing number of figures and groups in modern Western cultures com-
pared to the other concepts discussed above.
Compared to “the cultic milieu,” “secular religion” more explicitly reflects 
the seeker’s idea(l) that both religious and secular sources may be explored in 
the search for meaning. It also lacks the negative connotations that have ac-
crued around “cults” in the wake of shocking events such as Jonestown. Finally, 
it is not restricted to new, religious or clearly demarcated movements, like the 
later academic alternative of “new religious movement.”
Compared to “the New Age movement,” “secular religion” similarly includes 
transorganizational phenomena, without falsely suggesting that this necessar-
ily entails a unified movement. Unlike “New Age,” though, “secular religion” has 
not lost most of its emic and etic currency. In fact, it is starting to be used in 
similar ways by practitioners and scholars.
Compared to contemporary “spirituality,” “secular religion” more overtly 
challenges divisions between secular and religious domains, without being 
burdened by etymological ties to the purely metaphysical. This means, for 
instance, that “secular religion” does not need to construct contrived secular 
and religious subcategories, since it already inherently accommodates physical 
(often secular) and metaphysical (often religious) explanations of an ultimate 
concern that promises a fundamental transformation of the self in this world. 
Compared to “Western esotericism,” “secular religion” retains the twofold 
competition of knowledge between different secular and religious traditions 
of “the esoteric,” but it does not necessarily restrict this to “Western” culture. 
Granted, “secular” and “religion” are both modern Western terms (Dressler and 
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Mandair 2011: 3–36). This makes it problematic to apply them to premodern 
and non-Western cultures. I, therefore, consciously focused this article on 
modern Europe and North America. Nevertheless, if we paraphrase Taylor’s 
(2007: 1–24) influential take on secularity and religion as an awareness that the 
belief in a metaphysical power is one among many possible human percep-
tions of reality, I suspect “secular religion” could also be applied to modern 
non-Western cultures.
Compared to “metaphysical religion,” “secular religion” concerns similar 
quests for a felt and physical transformation of the self in this world. Yet it does 
not necessarily limit the source of this self-transformation to something be-
yond the physical plane that is not yet recognized by science. It recognizes that 
many figures and groups in modern Western cultures perceive their ultimate 
source of meaning as something physical, metaphysical, or both. Regardless 
of the perceived nature of their ultimate concern, these figures and groups all 
incorporate methods and theories from scientific and other secular domains 
to explain it — perhaps because they lack the vocabulary and authority of a 
single established tradition to corroborate their claims otherwise. As such, 
“secular religion” more accurately reflects the entangled nature of the quests 
for meaning of the people to whom it pertains.
5 Conclusion
Modernity’s disenchantment of reality has bankrupted conventional sources 
of meaning for many in Europe and North America. This has led a growing 
number of figures and groups to search for alternative sources of meaning 
outside established sciences and religions. Typical of their quests for meaning 
is the entanglement of secular and religious discourses, which challenge the 
modern secular–religious distinction itself.
Since the twentieth century, sociologists and historians have studied the 
social configurations of these figures and groups as “cults” or “new religious 
movements” and their discursive entanglements as “New Age” or “spirituality,” 
which have been categorized as parts of “Western esotericism” (Europe) or 
“metaphysical religion” (North America). Some scholars have also conceptual-
ized them as “secular religion,” but this has been overlooked.
In this article, I have demonstrated that the common concepts used in 
the study of entangled quests for meaning in modern Western cultures are 
not or no longer adequate. Emically, they are not recognized, or even re-
jected, by the practitioners to whom they pertain. Etically, they do not, 
or only partly, apply to the beliefs and practices they are meant to explain. 
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Therefore, I have suggested that “secular religion” is a more adequate con-
cept, because it retains the strengths but lacks the weaknesses of the more 
common concepts.
Is this not merely a matter of terminology? Could we not use my revised 
definition of secular religion for one of our more common concepts? I think 
not, because these concepts are either lacking or losing a logical connection 
with the socio-historical phenomena they are supposed to explain. They do 
not say what they mean. It is a matter of discourse. As Sara Mills rephrases 
Foucault, “Discourse does not simply translate reality into language; rather dis-
course should be seen as a system which structures the way that we perceive 
reality” (2003: 55). This shows what is at stake: our understanding of people’s 
changing perceptions and descriptions of “reality.” The words we use in study-
ing the world around us do not only determine how we see things, but what 
things we see to begin with. To give a simplistic example, if we want to study 
modern means of transportation, we should not refer to them as “cars.” That 
would limit our view to four-wheeled, road-bound vehicles. Similarly, if we 
want to study unbiasedly the quests for meaning of a growing number of fig-
ures and groups in modern Western cultures who are entangling secular and 
religious beliefs and practices from Western and Eastern traditions to explain 
their ultimate concerns in physical and metaphysical terms, then we should 
not categorize them pejoratively as “cults” or “new religious movements” that 
are “spiritual, but not religious” and belong to “Western esotericism” or “meta-
physical religion.” This is limiting or even distorting the popular interpreta-
tions of reality that we are trying to understand. Why not replace our arsenal 
of outworn concepts with a single concept that more accurately reflects peo-
ple’s changing perceptions and explanations of reality; why not reintroduce 
“secular religion”?
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